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THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND THE ENDS OF GOOD GOVERNMENT:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR RANDY BARNETT

Patrick McKinley Brennan 1

Introduction

People who are politically “conservative” or “libertarian” in the way those terms
are often deployed in contemporary American public discourse almost universally regard
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) as objectionable and, in a
related but distinct vein, unconstitutional. The favorite focus of such conservative/
libertarian protest is the Act’s so-called individual mandate, the requirement that
individuals buy health insurance from a private market. 2 As of the time of writing, two
federal district courts (one in Florida, the other in Virginia) have held the Act
unconstitutional on account of the individual mandate, and in each case the district judge
was appointed by a Republican president. 3 The two district judges that have upheld the
Act against constitutional challenge were appointed by a Democratic president. 4
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Regardless of whether one comes at it from the right, from the left, or from the middle,
however, the individual mandate merits a hard look: a statutory requirement that an
individual spend his or her money (on health insurance) unsettles many entrenched
American moral, political, and legal expectations. Whether it does so for good or for ill,
remains to be seen.
Consideration of some of the conservative/libertarian objections to the individual
mandate implicates some of the deepest and most contested questions concerning our
Constitution, constitutionalism in general, and the relation of positive law, including the
constitutional law, to the ends of good government. It is no exaggeration to say that it
even implicates questions about who we are. Professor Randy Barnett has recently
argued that the mandate implicates questions about the sovereignty of We the People.
Specifically, Barnett contends that the mandate is unconstitutional because it violates the
people’s sovereignty by “commandeering” them (into buying health insurance). 5 Why,
one must therefore ask, is it wrong for government to commandeer its people? The
Oxford English Dictionary defines commandeer as “to command or force into military
service,” which is not something the Act assays. The OED also defines commandeer as
“to take arbitrary possession of.” 6 But who can possibly contend that the individual
mandate, whatever its perceived merits or demerits, is an “arbitrary” act by Congress; it
was deeply deliberate. Perhaps Barnett’s objection is better phrased as government’s
commanding citizens to take this particular act? Is it not, however, part of the essential
function of government to command people on certain matters?
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In what follows, I will suggest why Barnett’s position depends upon a reading of
our moral, political, and legal traditions of understanding that is both debatable and, in
fact, mistaken. I will suggest, moreover, that as we gradually make and remake
American politico-legal culture, as we necessarily do, from one season to the next, we do
best to acknowledge and live within a creative tension regarding the jurisdiction of the
civil ruling authority, which requires, in turn, foregoing the cheap fictions of sovereignty
that, alas, stud contemporary and historical Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Why a “creative tension?” On the one hand, we cannot reasonably assume that
that government is best that governs least; there may be some important human goods
that only government can deliver. On the other, we cannot reasonably presume that
government is the proper solvent of all problems; some human goods only individuals or
groups other than the state can achieve. The amount and forms of government that are
required or desirable, moreover, vary across time and circumstance. Always, however,
determining what role government should play in particular times and places precludes
absolutism – the absolutism of imagined popular or individual or state “sovereignty.” It
also precludes the stealth absolutism of “originalism,” of a particular sort, in
constitutional interpretation.

I. Setting the Constitutional Doctrinal Context
The individual mandate invites inspection for possible (un)constitutionality on
any number of grounds, but the focus here will be its constitutional status vis-a-vis the
Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause. The focus,
more specifically, will be its status under the Commerce Clause as currently construed, as
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opposed to its status under any number of possible “originalist” or other construals. As
such (but with a possible exception to be noted below), the mandate must be sustainable,
if at all, as a regulation of economic (as opposed to non-economic) activity that works a
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce. Under United v. Lopez (1995), there are
“three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power.” 7 First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” 8
Second, “Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities.” 9 And third, “Congress’ commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” 10 Plainly, if the
individual mandate is sustainable under the Commerce Clause, it would be thanks to the
third prong of the Lopez test, i.e., regulation of activity that has a “substantial effect” on
interstate commerce.
Unlike the first two prongs of the test set out in Lopez, the substantial effects test
is not, according to Barnett, the product of an interpretation of the Commerce Clause
standing alone, nor even exactly of the Commerce Clause. Rather, according to Barnett,
that test is correctly interpreted as an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause “in
the context of the regulation of interstate commerce.” 11 While others view the matter
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differently (and think that the Court has since the New Deal expanded the very meaning
of “commerce”), I will simply stipulate to Barnett’s position here, because it is this – the
presence of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a link in the chain of argument – that
provides Barnett with the textual predicate for his argument that the individual mandate is
unconstitutional because it violates our sovereignty.
According to Barnett, if the regulation is of economic activity, then it is
constitutionally permissible provided that it is both necessary and proper. Very often,
“necessary” and “proper” are treated either as a unit or as an instance of pleonasm. If
each word is given its own meaning, however, what is necessary must also be proper.
Barnett makes a strong case for giving each word its own bite. 12 On Barnett’s view,
there are right ways (proper) and wrong ways (improper) of going about regulating what
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce (necessary). There is more to be said
shortly about the demands of “proper,” but first there is a further reason why this question
that so rarely gets asked – about what is “proper” regulation – is apt.
That further reason involves a legal argument that seems to be picking up steam,
though not yet a majority vote, in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. While
conditionally conceding that the mandate must meet the “economic activity” test of Lopez
and its progeny, some proponents of the mandate have also recently defended it, in the
alternative, on the ground that, although not itself regulation of an economic act, it is a
necessary and proper component of a larger regulatory scheme, which combination they
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contend is sufficient to pass constitutional muster. 13 These proponents have on their side
not only dicta and implicatures of Lopez itself, but also language in the majority opinion
of the more recent case Gonzales v. Raich, 14 as well as a theory that Justice Scalia
explicitly developed in his concurring opinion in the same case: “As we implicitly
acknowledged in Lopez, . . . Congress’s authority to enact laws necessary and proper for
the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” 15
Although the Court has yet to adopt Justice Scalia’s theory that Congress’s power
to regulate is not confined to economic activity, one can reasonably ask how the
individual mandate would fare if it did. If it be conceded that the mandate itself is not a
regulation of economic activity but is “necessary” because it is essential to a broader
scheme of regulation of interstate commerce, there remains that further question to be
asked: Is it a “proper” means to Congress’s exercise of its power over insurance
commerce? According to the enduring test set out by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” 16
As parsed by Barnett, this sentence establishes that a means is proper when it, first, is not
prohibited and, second, otherwise “consists with the letter and spirit of the
constitution.” 17
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Accepting for present purposes this understanding of the requirements of what it
is to be “proper,” is the individual mandate proper, or not? Assuming it is not forbidden,
does it yet “consist[] with the letter and spirit of the constitution,” or not?
In order to establish that it does not so consist, Barnett next invokes a recent line of cases,
the “anti-commandeering” cases, as they are often called, because they hold that
Congress cannot “commandeer” the states (in certain respects). For the definitional
reason mentioned at the outset, this line of cases seems to operate under a misnomer:
military service is not involved, and there is no hint that the Congressional commands at
issue are arbitrary. In any event, it has long been established that the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI requires that state judges can be “commandeered” – if that word even
makes sense in this context – to follow federal law. 18 The principle that Congress cannot
commandeer state legislative or executive actions is of more recent vintage and
questionable strength. 19 There is also a question about whether the principle has more
than an “attenuated basis” in the Tenth Amendment.20 Be all of this as it may, the
relevant aspects of the “anti-commandeering” cases are familiar.
In the first, New York v. United States (1992), the Court struck down Congress’s
attempt to use its commerce power to mandate that any state that refused to enter into
interstate compacts to dispose of nuclear waste must itself take title to the nuclear waste.
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained that “the Constitution has never
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been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the states to govern
according to Congress’ instructions.” 21 Congress’s giving governing instructions to the
states Justice O’Connor characterized as an unconstitutional “commandeering,” which
term she took from the 1981 case Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining: “Congress may not
simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’” 22 In New York, the Court held that
“the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, an outcome that has never been
understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.” 23
Then, five years later, Congress used its commerce power to mandate that local
sheriffs run background checks on gun buyers. In Printz v. United States 24 , the Supreme
Court held that this, too, was an improper “commandeering” of state officials. Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia recognized a principle of state sovereignty underlying several
provisions of the Constitution, 25 primarily, however, the Tenth Amendment. “[R]esidual
state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution’s conferral upon
Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I,
sec.8,” wrote Justice Scalia, “which implication was rendered express by the Tenth
Amendment’s statement that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
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to the people.’” 26 In sum, wrote Justice Scalia: “The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the states to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program. . . . [S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our
constitutional system of dual sovereignty.” 27
Responding to the argument that this statutory directive was “necessary and
proper” as a means of Congress’s effectuating its commerce power, Justice Scalia
memorably described that the Necessary and Proper Clause as “the last, best hope of
those who would defend ultra vires congressional action.” 28 He went on to assert:
“When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the
principle of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional
provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce
Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’
which deserves to be treated as such.’” 29
Barnett, after marshalling additional evidence that the Court’s constitutional
prohibition on national “commandeering” of states is rooted above all in the Tenth
Amendment, makes his decisive next move, which is to note that the Tenth Amendment
reserves undelegated powers not just to the states, but “to the states respectively, or to the
people.” 30 He continues:
As Justice Thomas wrote in his dissenting opinion in U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton, the Tenth Amendment “avoids
taking any position on the division of power between the
26
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states governments and the people of the States” – a
position he reasserted just last term in his dissenting
opinion in Comstock in which Justice Scalia joined. In this
way, the text of the Tenth Amendment recognizes popular
sovereignty as it does state sovereignty. 31
Barnett’s syllogism is straightforward: Just as Congress cannot commandeer states,
because they are sovereign, so too Congress cannot commandeer the people, because they
are sovereign. Therefore, the individual mandate, which surely “commandeers” – that is,
commands – people (by making them spend their own money on health insurance), is
unconstitutional.
Maybe, but maybe not. What on earth does it mean to assert that the Tenth
Amendment – or anything else? – makes people or states “sovereign?” Saying it is so
does not make it so. The question of whether the predication at issue is true cannot be
answered in an historical or linguistic vacuum. Smooth though Barnett’s syllogism is,
there are reasons to suggest the validity of the premise that We the People are sovereign
(and therefore not amenable to being commandeered). The argument from sovereignty
proves too much, and thus proves nothing. It is a problem of too many “sovereigns,” and
therefore of none at all.

II. Multiplying Sovereigns
The linguistic antecedent of the English word “sovereignty” is traceable to
fourteenth-century French, where in common and sometimes in legal parlance it referred
to any official endowed with superior force. 32 It did not originally signify a freedom
from all superior ruling authority and a complete independence of judgment and self-

31
32

Barnett, supra note 5, at 36.
JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 38 n.31 (1951).

10

determination, but over time, however, “[s]uch was the idea, and the purpose for which
the word Sovereignty was coined.” 33 In the modern period, a claim to “sovereignty”
veers, like a car out of alignment, in the direction of being a claim to be free from all
interference with possible self-determination and complete independence. Though that
was not the original meaning of the term, such is what it was sculpted to mean in the
contending historical claims of contest to emerge from the medieaval social hierarchy of
Christendom. Those who today claim or assert sovereignty – whether they be nation
states, states, tribes, churches, or individuals – are saying in a highfalutin way what in the
vernacular goes as follows: “you’re not the boss of me.” Nations claiming sovereignty
deny other nations the authority to rule over them; states and tribal nations claiming
sovereignty insist upon their own freedom of self-determination; and so forth.
Some claims to self-determination are commendable, indeed needful: the brute
assertion of power over another – whether that other be a nation state, a tribe, a church, a
state, or an individual – does not entail legitimacy. There are times when it is morally
exigent to deny another’s claims to exercise ruling power, and a claim to be “sovereign”
is one historically attested, if blunt, way to make just such a denial. Still, no one except
the anarchist denies that some exertions of power over another are, indeed, legitimate.
Somebody has to be the boss of somebody, else we shall have no governance and, as a
result, no order and none of the human goods that can accrue only thanks to order. This
is not a point of sophisticated political theory or of logic, nor, even, of debate. No group
or its members can long exist, let alone prosper, without some measure of relatively
stable agreement about who is in charge, and of what. It is the work of politics and
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political philosophy (and perhaps theology) to draw the lines concerning who is properly
the boss of whom, and concerning what.
The Constitution of the United States was drafted and ratified against a
background of fierce debate about the location of sovereignty, and specifically the
transference of sovereignty from Parliament to the people. 34 The Articles of
Confederation imputed sovereignty to each of the thirteen colonies. 35 Even after the
Constitution had been ratified, James Madison sought unsuccessfully to have recognition
of the people’s sovereignty “prefixed to the constitution.” 36 To our Constitution as
enacted and ratified and handed down, the term “sovereignty” is wholly unknown: the
word simply does not appear in the document
Despite that deafening constitutional silence, however, our constitutional
jurisprudence is thick with the concept of sovereignty. Indeed, a brief inspection of the
evidence reveals that the Supreme Court tries to solve some of the nation’s most
important socio-legal questions by multiplying predications of sovereignty and applying
them to just about all-comers. One can hardly blame Barnett for resorting to litigation
argument that sounds in terms of sovereignty: contemporary Supreme Court
jurisprudence would make practically everybody except the family dog a sovereign.
Ironically, such jurisprudence ends up making nobody but the Court the closest thing to a
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true sovereign, because it is the Court that has final say over which “sovereign” will
prevail in which contests. But this is to get ahead of things.
While to the Constitution of the United States the term “sovereign” is totally
unknown, the term entered our constitutional jurisprudence early, and with a vengeance,
in the celebrated 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia. In its first big constitutional case, the
Supreme Court there held that the state of Georgia was not entitled to have Chisholm’s
suit in federal court for money damages dismissed on the ground that Georgia was a
sovereign state clothed with the sovereign’s traditional immunity to unconsented suit.
The Chisholm Court’s jurisdictional decision was promptly overruled by the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment, of course, but the thesis that the states were sovereign was just
getting going. Although the Eleventh Amendment speaks only in terms of the lack of
jurisdiction of the federal courts in suits against states by citizens of other states 37 , since
1890 and the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, the Court has “understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it
confirms.” 38 After a century of incremental growth and occasional recession, that
presupposition came to full flower in a trinity of cases decided over seven years by the
Rehnquist Court, Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996), 39 Alden v. Maine (1999), 40 and
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority (2002), 41 in which the
Court found that states were immune to unconsented private suits for money damages in,
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respectively, federal court, state court, and federal administrative tribunals. In each case
the ground was the same, viz., the “presupposition” that Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
baldly in Seminole: “each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system.” 42
These declarations of the sovereignty of the states presuppose, however, the
contending claim that the United States -- the nation -- is sovereign. How can there be
two sovereigns in the same place at the same time? Isn’t this to vitiate the very concept
of sovereignty: freedom from all higher ruling authority and complete independence?
This is exactly the problem the Framers set out to solve, and they persuaded not a few,
including Justice Anthony Kennedy, that they succeeded. In the late eighteenth century,
political theorists derided the idea of an imperium in imperio, an empire within an
empire, frequently terming it a “solecism.” 43 In his well known concurrence in U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton (1994), Justice Kennedy undertook to dissolve the lingering
appearance of solecism by the use of metaphor: “[t]he Framers split the atom of
sovereignty.” 44 Five years later, in his opinion for the Court in Alden v. Maine, Justice
Kennedy switched descriptive gears and explained that the Nation enjoys “primary
sovereignty,” while the states enjoy a “‘residual and inviolable sovereignty.’” 45
Even this impressive multiplication of sovereigns hardly exhausts the roster. Way
back in Chisholm already, the seriatim opinions of Chief Justice John Jay and Justice
James Wilson rejected the sovereignty of the states on the very basis of the sovereignty of
the people. Jay wrote that “at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people;
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and they are truly the sovereigns of the country . . . .” 46 Justice Wilson, whose famed
Lectures on Law at Penn had addressed the concept of sovereignty extensively in the two
years preceding the decision in Chisholm, was ripe to the task in his opinion in the case:
To the Constitution of the United States the term sovereign,
is totally unknown. There is but one place where it could
have been used with propriety. But even in that place it
would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of
those, who ordained and established that Constitution.
They might have announced themselves “sovereign” people
of the United States: But serenely conscious of the fact,
they avoided the ostentatious declaration. 47
In his remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of the United
States (1787), Wilson had argued, against those who were absolutists about the
sovereignty of the states under the Articles of Confederation, “that, in this country, the
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power resides in the people at large.” 48
This is a thick concept of sovereignty indeed, and it is this that provides Barnett
with premise necessary to his syllogism: “[I]n affirming the underlying principle of state
sovereignty within the federal system, the Supreme Court has never repudiated its early
affirmations of popular sovereignty in Chisholm. . . . If imposing mandates on state
legislatures and executives intrudes improperly into state sovereignty, might mandating
the people improperly infringe popular sovereignty?” 49 His answer is yes, in support of
which Barnett also cites later Supreme Court cases that do undertake to reaffirm the
popular sovereignty jurisprudence of Chisholm. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins
(1886), the Court explained that “in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to

46
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agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
whom all government exists and acts.” 50
National, state, and popular pretensions to sovereignty already dazzle the analytic
mind. Even this swelling collection of “sovereigns,” however, does not exhaust the
contest for complete independence. Justice Wilson did not maintain only that the people
en bloc are sovereign. No, the reason “the people” can be sovereign, according to
Wilson, is that each individual person is an “original sovereign” who can aggregate
himself or herself with other original sovereigns to create “a collection of original
sovereigns.” 51 Under contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence, moreover, every
individual is something approximating a sovereign in a sense more impressive than
Wilson ever could have imagined. That jurisprudence, as is familiar, recognizes the
individual’s right to be self-norming, subject only – so far as appears – to the
constitutional limit of the Millean harm principle. While the Court did not mention either
sovereignty or Mill by name in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 52 , in which it struck down a
Texas statute that criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a
member of the same sex (a man),” Lawrence has been widely celebrated as a recognition
of the right of individuals to be self-norming, limited only by the harm principle.
Barnett himself, in fact, has been among the leading champions of such a reading
of Lawrence. 53 Another commentator summed up this reading of Lawrence as follows,
here from a critical angle:
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In Lawrence . . . the Court in effect held, in agreement
with and at the urging of the libertarian Cato Institute, that
the Constitution . . . enact[s] John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.
The result, if consistently followed, would be to presume
unconstitutional all laws limiting “liberty,” i.e.,
substantially all laws, and put on the states or national
government the burden of justifying them. As a corollary
of this philosophic position and illustrating its potential, the
Court explicitly rejected traditional standards of morality as
a means of meeting the government’s burden of
justification. 54
To fill in the unstated but operative intermediate premise in Lawrence, one need only
quote the very language of Mill’s On Liberty itself: “Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign.” 55
In sum, under current American constitutional jurisprudence, “sovereignty” is
predicated (either explicitly or implicitly) of four very different types of thing: the nation,
each state, the people, and the individual. (Actually, there is a fifth category of
“sovereign” under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the tribal nation). 56 Given this
diversity, it can safely be conceded that the property signified by the word “sovereign” -whatever that property turns out to be -- is not being predicated univocally. In exactly
what sense, then, is each of these very different things “sovereign?” What is it to be
possessed of “sovereignty?”

III. Making Some Sense of Sovereignty
Predications of sovereignty abound and multiply in contemporary culture, but the
concept of sovereignty is associated with no one as much as with Thomas Hobbes, a man
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whose political theory many of his contemporaries found terrifying. 57 By “sovereignty”
Hobbes meant the powers of a nothing short of a “mortal god:”
The multitude united in one person is called a
COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak
more reverently) of that Mortal God to which we owe,
under the Immortal God, our peace and defence. For by
this authority, given him by every particular man in the
commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and
strength conferred on him by that terror thereof he is
enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home
and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. . . .
And he that carrieth this person is called SOVEREIGN, and
said to have Sovereign Power, and everyone besides, his
SUBJECT. 58
As Philip Pettit has pointed out, “Hobbes is conscious that this doctrine of more or less
absolute sovereign authority may seem incredible when applied to individual monarchs.
He therefore tries,” Pettit continues, “to make a general case for the absolute extent of
sovereignty by insisting that the rights that seem natural in the case of a wholly
democratic sovereign – if indeed they do seem natural – must be ascribed on parallel
grounds to a sovereign of any kind.” 59 On Hobbes’s account, to be sovereign is to be
bound by no law – not laws of his own making, nor even the divine natural law, as Pettit
underlines: “the sovereign may behave toward subjects in a way that breaches natural
law.” 60
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Hobbes’s is not the only canonical account of what it means to be sovereign.
When the nature of sovereignty was clarified – and, in important respects, standardized –
three-quarters of a century earlier by Jean Bodin, the focal meaning was instructively
different from the one Hobbes would later proffer. Bodin’s context was the relationship
between the lawgiver (what we would now routinely refer to as the state) and the law,
and the question on his plate was whether the lawgiver was “sovereign” in the sense of
not being bound even by the law. The answer Bodin gave was that the lawgiver was
indeed above – that is, not bound by – some human law. Bodin did not, however, defend
a complete independence from antecedent law on the part of the lawgiver. Sovereignty
as Bodin defended it did not mean what it would later mean for Hobbes, viz., that the
prince or government is not subject to higher law. 61 Indeed, as Kenneth Pennington has
demonstrated beyond cavil, for Bodin (and the tradition he continued), the relation
between the lawgiver and higher law is quite the opposite: while free from some human
laws, the human lawgiver, though “sovereign” in the exact sense of not being bound by
some human laws, remains bound by higher (and, again, some human) law. 62 Though
commentators on Bodin frequently miss the point, Bodin is unmistakably clear about the
human lawmaker’s – the “sovereign’s” – subordination to higher law:
These doctors do not say what absolute power is. For if we
say that to have absolute power is not to be subject to any
laws at all, no prince of this world will be sovereign, since
every earthly prince is subject to the laws of God and of
61
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nature and to various human laws that are common to all
peoples. 63
And again:
Those who state it as a general rule that princes are not
subject to their laws, or even to their contracts, give offense
to God unless they make an exception for the law of God
and of nature and the just contracts and treaties that princes
have entered into . . . . 64
If sovereignty sometimes means the ruler’s complete independence from all law (unless
and until and for as long as one agree to be bound by it), it assuredly did not mean that
for Bodin 65 or the tradition he continued. That meaning about governmental power came
later, first with Hobbes and later with others. 66
The sovereign governor’s claim to be above the law, moreover, has now been all
but conferred on the governed. These changes have not been unrelated to each other.
“Liberty of the sovereign was as much outside the philosophy of the Middle Ages as was
radical liberty of the individual. The period during which emancipation of the individual
made progress was the same as that in which emancipation of the sovereign was
achieved.” 67 Sovereignty has become a normative claim for individuals to be something
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approaching self-norming, as in Lawrence. Wilson was a purely modern man when he
propounded at Penn that unless and until a person put himself under law, he cannot be
bound by law. Barnett is a thoroughly modern man when he agrees with Wilson and
argues that we begin from individual sovereignty and “a presumption of liberty,” 68 where
these mean that the individual is presumptively ungoverned.
As Barnett himself concedes, however, including in this very context, the
presumption of individual liberty is only that, a conditional claim that can be rebutted.
Even Barnett does not deny that government can and should refuse some attempts at
“liberty,” viz., those that would cause “harm.” Individuals are not, therefore,
meaningfully “sovereign” – unless all that term means is that individuals are subject to
legal regulation only when they are in fact subject to legal regulation. 69 Nor are the
people writ large meaningfully “sovereign:” they are subject to valid laws of general
applicability. Are the states meaningfully sovereign? They are subject to valid
regulation by the national government. Is the nation sovereign? It is subject to the norms
of international law. It is also, at least arguably, subject to the norms of higher law – the
contention and condition Hobbes was out to deny.
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IV. Transforming the Politico-Legal Culture Away from Competing “Sovereigns”
This last point, about the bearing of higher law on government, raises a larger
context in which to evaluate the individual mandate. Barnett wants us – indeed, wants
the Supreme Court – to begin from a baseline presumption of liberty and (what he takes
to be its correlate) a presumption against regulation. Leaving aside for the moment the
unstated justifications of those presumptions, however, it should be noted that a
presumption in favor of liberty does not itself entail an absence of regulation. For
example, some individuals may not be “free” to be healthy unless they obtain medical
care; these same individuals may not be able to obtain medical care unless they have
health insurance; and they may on the occasion not have health insurance unless by
regulation they have been compelled to buy such insurance. As is familiar, the category
of “liberty” is not exhausted by negative liberty (freedom from interference); it also
includes positive liberty (freedom to act or be in a certain way). 70 The freedom to be
healthy may be enhanced by regulation, and this apparently is what the Congress that
passed the PPACA thought.
Even if that is indeed what Congress was up to (as the legislative history suggests
it is), Congress’s regulatory activity on behalf of health immediately bumps up against
the fact of how we generally think about the role of government, or at least our
government, and, correlatively, of ourselves. As William Eskridge and John Ferejohn
have recently registered in A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution, the
dominant model of constitutionalism in America today is one in which the Constitution is
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construed, by judges, to protect only negative rights. “The biggest shortcoming of
America’s judge-centric Constitution,” Eskridge and Ferejohn write, “is its seeming
emphasis on negative rights or, in common parlance, its libertarianism.” 71 While not
denying that there has been a long Anglo-American tradition (even one predating the
framing and ratification of our Constitution) of limiting government’s role to protecting
negative liberty, Eskridge and Ferejohn observe that “[t]he Supreme Court has focused
Constitutionalism upon negative rights and governmental limits – much more than is
justified even by the classic ‘liberal’ political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes.” 72
This is an intriguing claim, and its meaning turns in part on what it is involved in
“justifying” what we do with or under our Constitution. Without questioning the fact of
the libertarian strand of our socio-political culture and what it might mean for
constitutional interpretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn call attention to the other strands of
that culture and what they in turn should mean for such interpretation. In particular, they
contend that “mega-statutes” form part of our nation’s “fundamental law,” right alongside
the Constitution itself. 73 The PPACA was passed after A Republic of Statutes went to
press, but Eskridge and Ferejohn do include the Medicare Act of 1965 as an example of a
statutory commitment to a positive benefit that has become entrenched as part of
America’s fundamental law. 74
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s elegant and controversial argument in favor of treating
statutes and the administrative schemes they launch on a par with the Constitution defies
summary here. What it establishes, though, at a minimum, is that there is a mainstream
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argument that highlights the ways in which our legal regime already and largely without
controversy treats the people not as presumptively “sovereign,” but instead as properly
the subject of some regulation that confers positive liberties. Even if such regulation is
arguably inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, Eskridge and
Ferejohn continue, it ought now to be treated as functionally amending the document, in
part because that document’s procedures for formal amendment are too cumbersome to
be met except in exceptional circumstances.
No one could plausibly think that the Constitution as originally understood
included a right to adequate medical care, but when Franklin Delano Roosevelt
announced a Second Bill of Rights in his State of Union Address, on January 11, 1944,
he included just such a right. “FDR did not believe these rights,” including the right to
adequate medical are, “were already in the Constitution, nor did he seek an Article V
amendment. His project,” Eskridge and Ferejohn explain, “was to recognize these
affirmative rights as fundamental commitments that a democratic government should be
making to its citizens; FDR’s deeper project,” they continue,
was to perfect the Lockean state and recast government
legitimacy as resting on its capacity to create structures
allowing every American to create a flourishing life – the
concrete starting point for the consumerist constitution that
has governed our country for the past two generations. The
primary mechanism for Roosevelt’s grand project was
superstatutes. 75
The names of many of those statutes passed in the 1930s, such as the Agriculture
Adjustment Act of 1935 and the Social Security Act of 1935, are familiar to students of
American history and law. As mentioned above, passage of the Medicare Act took thirty
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years from the time of passage of Social Security Act. 76 And, needless to say, it took
until just last year for Congress to enact legislation aimed a comprehensive guarantee of
the seventh right enumerated by FDR: “to adequate medical care” and “good health.” 77
Barnett contends that a fatal defect in the individual mandate is that there is no
“pre-existing duty” on the part of individuals to act, even for their own health. 78 There
was indeed no legal duty prior to passage of the mandate, but are duty and obligation
exhausted by positive law? Yes, if we begin with Barnett’s splendidly simple
presumption of liberty and a purely or largely negative role for the state. But we need not
begin with that presumption, as Eskridge and Ferejohn have demonstrated. As times
change, the positive obligations of government and the correlative positive rights of the
governed can change. This is a proposition civic republicans, such as Eskridge and
Ferejohn, affirm. 79 It should also be affirmed, moreover, by those, whether civic
republican or not, who approach the question of the role of government from a moral
perfectionist point of view in ethics and go on to affirm, on that basis, that it is the role of
government to be prevenant on behalf of those who do not provide for themselves. Call
this paternalism if you like, but that is no argument against it.
Still, someone may object, ours is a written constitution, meant to endure for ages
without alteration except through the mechanisms of amendment provided in Article V,
and our Constitution provides whatever legally enforceable rights there are. As
mentioned, Eskridge and Ferejohn have specifically denied this normative argument
76
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about Article V’s being the exclusive mechanism for amendment, arguing instead that
superstatutes, such as the PPACA, should be read as de facto constitutional amendments,
sources of new rights and duties of the highest positive-law order. 80 Whether or not one
agrees with them about that, though, the prospect of giving a non-originalist meaning to
the Constitution returns us to a cautionary point I flagged at the outset. There are deep
reasons to be wary of originalism in the absolutist way it is often understood.

V. Questions More Fundamental than Assertions of “Sovereingty”
One of the remarkable facts about many of those who are originalists about the
Constitution is that they are only sometimes originalist about the objects of their political
affection. The topic that has been the focus here, sovereignty, is perhaps the most glaring
example of originalists’ selectivity. Even among originalists, originalism has more than
one meaning, but common to all of them is a demand for close attention to the words of
the Constitution. As we have seen, however, sovereignty does not so much as appear in
the Constitution, let alone as a property of, respectively, the nation, the states, the people,
and individuals, not to mention tribes. The originalist arguments in favor of sovereignty
can only be defended on originalist grounds, therefore, on the theory that they are
supported by the original purposes – though not the words – of the Constitution.
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But if it is legitimate to consider the purposes behind the Constitution where there
are no words to guide us in discerning those purposes, it is surely almost a fortiori that
we should consider the Constitution’s purposes where there are words to guide us in that
discernment. Someone might counter that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which in
this context would mean that words preempt purposes. This should be so, however, if at
all, only if those who framed and ratified the Constitution wished their words to be
treated as exhausting their purposes. But why would we, in turn, agree to be bound by a
document that we cannot integrate into purposive human living? Many originalists,
Justice Anton Scalia among them, will answer this last question by arguing that the very
point of any written constitution, including our own, is to establish an unchanging legal
bedrock. 81
The question, though, is whether we can properly do just that. Can we humans
properly set up some text and agree to bind ourselves to it come what may? In other
words, is it morally permissible for us to be absolutists about a (written) constitution? 82
If, as Justice Wilson contended, we are “original sovereigns,” then the answer is
presumably yes: it is the privilege of an original sovereign to do what he or she will,
including in concert with other original sovereigns. If, however, we start from the
judgment that we are instead under an indefeasible moral obligation to set up good
government in order to meet our human needs and worthy aspirations, then the question
of the tenability of an “unchangeable” constitution alters. Humans operating under a
moral obligation to set up worthy government can bind themselves to a text only to the
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extent doing so is, all things considered, a prudent way of achieving the ends of good
governance. What is prudent will predictably vary from time to time and place to place.
This is the locus of the creative tension to which I referred at the beginning.
We come, then, to a fundamental decision about who we think we are, and it is on
the basis of this decision that some of our most basic choices about law’s scope must be
made. Are we “original sovereigns?” 83 Or are we, instead, under a moral obligation to
set up worthy structures of government in order to achieve the good life for humans? The
latter is the perspective of the natural law tradition, which, though not dominant in
American political discourse, has not been absent. 84 And those who affirm it as true –
those who believe that we humans, including the lawgivers themselves, are under a
higher law obligation to seek the good life, including by setting up good government and
framing good laws – will view themselves as morally obligated, in an indefeasible way,
to struggle against those who would be absolutists about texts, or would assert a
“presumption of liberty” and leave it at that. Texts should be in the service of worthy
human purposes, and some of those purposes require government aid rather than a
laissez-faire libertarianism. Interestingly, the somewhat more expansive view of
government’s role to which the traditional understanding of the natural law leads, tends
to align its adherents more with the contemporary American left than with the
contemporary American right, at least on some important matters.
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Whether the individual mandate is in fact a prudent legislative response to a
perceived human problem, is not a question I will attempt to answer here. 85 My aim has
been to show why the argument that the mandate violates individual sovereignty assumes
answers to metaphysical questions that I have not heard from Barnett. 86 That we are
original sovereigns is a claim that must be argued for, not merely asserted. So, too, is
that the natural law claim that we are not sovereign but are instead obligated to seek the
good life, including through the creation of government that is at the service of the
people. 87 This much is beyond dispute, however: “when we return to a conception of
sovereignty that recognizes norms outside the state’s positive law, we shall be returning
to a system of thought that has deep roots in Western law.” 88 In this, I submit, we should
take some real satisfaction, though Barnett would probably disagree. Meanwhile, “[t]he
only obstacles in the way of [sovereignty’s] indefinite growth are three orders of laws, all
of which came to be abrogated by three historical facts: irreligion, legal positivism and
sovereignty of the people.” 89
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